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1 Introduction
Contemporary tools for the analysis of communicating processes are all es-
sentially based on an explicit state space representation [6,9,11,17,26,30]. In
some cases speciﬁc data types have an explicit encoding (e.g. time in [9]), and
in other cases compression techniques have been applied to the representation
of states [6,17]. The tools have matured to the level where systematically er-
rors can be found in relatively small process descriptions. Applying the tools
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to larger and real-life systems is a continuous battle with the so-called state
space explosion problem. The essence is that basically every communicating
process that is analysed has more states than can be represented within such
tools. The consequence is that behavioural analysis must be restricted to small
instances under restricted communication scenarios.
By extending this state based approach a steady progress can be expected.
Computers become larger and faster, and better state space compression and
analysis techniques will be invented. However, we are convinced that in order
to make a substantial step forward, a more radical development is necessary.
We believe that using the μCRL tool set [12] we made such a step by intro-
ducing the concept of a linear process.
Using techniques described in [32] it is possible to transform all μCRL
processes to linear form. The tools that do this are able to perform this
operation for systems consisting of hundreds of parallel processes. A linear
process allows all kinds of manipulations that can easily be automated. The
crucial point is that (a) human ingenuity can determine which operations must
be applied and (b) computer programs are available to carry these out. A
very similar situation can be found in engineering mathematics where Maple,
Mathlab and Mathematica have become tools to interactively manipulate large
mathematical formulae. We believe it is essential that a tool set is grounded
in a sound theoretical framework. For μCRL a good summary of the state of
the art is given in [13].
In the current paper we will demonstrate the use of μCRL to a popular ap-
plication domain, viz. the veriﬁcation of security protocols. The importance of
formal methods in the analysis of security protocols is evident in the fact that
developing correct security protocols is notoriously diﬃcult. Many proposed
and even many implemented security protocols have been found to contain
errors. The reason for this is that it is hard to predict all possible attacks that
an intruder can use to break security.
The Dolev-Yao intruder model (see [10]) is the most widely accepted way
of modelling an intruder. In this model the intruder has complete control over
the network. He can intercept messages and construct new messages from all
information that he can deduce from the messages sent by agents. The growth
of the intruder knowledge, and thus the number of diﬀerent messages that the
intruder can construct, is the major reason for the exponential growth in the
number of possible behaviours of the system.
Model checking and theorem proving are the most used formal methods
for verifying security protocols. Theorem proving requires the development of
a proof logic for security properties (see e.g. [4]) and in general needs user in-
teraction. Model checking (see e.g. [18]) suﬀers from the state-space explosion
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problem, but can be done automatically. We will demonstrate the powerful
state reduction techniques of the μCRL model checker by analysing a variant
of the Bilateral Key Exchange (BKE, see [5]) protocol. The purpose of this
protocol is to establish a fresh cryptographic key between two agents which
should remain secret from a possible intruder. In order to keep our focus on
the modelling of a security protocol, rather than on the modelling of security
properties, we will concentrate on the secrecy requirement only. An extension
to authentication properties, such as agreement (see e.g. [19]), is outside the
scope of this paper. However, we believe that a formalization in μCRL could
easily follow the treatment in [28].
Formal veriﬁcation of security protocols has been a topic of research for
over twenty years now. Burrows, Abadi and Needham developed a modal
logic, the so-called BAN-logic [4], which allows to reason about the knowledge
of agents interacting in a security protocol. This approach has a weaker in-
truder model than currently agreed upon by most veriﬁcation approaches. The
seminal work on BAN logic inﬂuenced the development of many more sophis-
ticated approaches, which were based on logics, process algebras, operational
semantics, etc. A well-known process algebraic approach is based on CSP
and makes use of the model checking tool FDR and the Casper compiler [28].
This tool uses process inclusion, whereas our approach uses bisimulation to
express process properties. Another general model checking tool which has
been extensively applied to security protocols is the Murϕ tool [25]. The
strand spaces approach [31] provides a view on security protocols at a more
abstract level than the process algebraic approaches. It uses a partial order on
the executed events to describe a set of agents running some security protocol.
Security properties are proven by analysing so-called penetrator strands. This
approach has various ideas in common withe the inductive approach of Paul-
son [27]. The latter uses the theorem prover Isabelle for the computer aided
veriﬁcation of security protocols. Another approach based on theorem proving
can be found in the Athena tool (see [29]). The Brutus tool [7], like our tool, is
a model checker. Brutus is specially targeted to security protocols and is based
on a speciﬁc partial order reduction, whereas the μCRL toolset is a tool chain,
one tool of which is based on a more general partial order reduction technique
(conﬂuence elimination). Millen and Shmatikov [23] designed an algorithm to
analyse all possible states of an executing security protocol while postponing
the instantiation of variables and deﬁning constraints on each variable. This
technique provides a signiﬁcant reduction of the state space. The NRL Pro-
tocol Analyzer [22] is a model checker that attempts to locate security ﬂaws
by working backwards from an insecure state.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we will explain the μCRL
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language and its tool set. The Bilateral Key Exchange protocol and its spec-
iﬁcation are treated in Section 3. Modelling of the adversary is discussed in
Section 4. Optimisations are the subject of Section 5. Finally, the results are
evaluated in Section 6.
Acknowledgement
We thank Cas Cremers for the fruitful discussions on modelling the BKE
protocol. We also thank the referees for their very useful comments.
2 A short primer in μCRL
The language μCRL (micro Common Representation Language) [12,13] has
been deﬁned in 1990. At that time it had been understood that process
algebras were a very suitable way to describe the behaviour of systems. Yet,
process algebras did not include data as ﬁrst class citizen, but treated it in
a rather opportunistic way. E.g. in [24] data to be communicated can only
stem from ﬁnite domains (see especially section 2.8 in [24]), data as process
parameters are dealt with using unbounded process variables and the language
lacks explicit data deﬁnition mechanisms. In order to treat data on equal
footing with the process behaviour speciﬁcation languages such as PSF [21]
and LOTOS [3] were designed. The language μCRL added to this a full and
symmetric axiomatic treatment of data and processes. These latter languages
allow communication of data from inﬁnite domains, have higher order process
variables, instead of unbounded sets and comprise a full deﬁnition language
suitable to deﬁne all relevant datatypes.
The consequence is a bare language of suﬃcient expressivity with a pre-
cisely deﬁned semantics, basic axioms, proof methodology and a full range
of analysis tools. In this section we shortly explain the language and the
main ideas behind the veriﬁcation methodologies and tools. For a much more
extensive treatment, we refer to [13].
2.1 The data language
Basically, μCRL consists of a data part and a process part. The data part is
built up from very simple equational abstract data types. All data sorts that
are used in a speciﬁcation must be declared. Sorts can be declared by
sort Bool N List
This declares three sorts. All sorts are non empty. The sort Bool is special
in the sense that it must have exactly two diﬀerent elements denoted by t and
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f. The reason for this is that terms of sort Bool are used in conditions in
process terms. Note that the diﬀerence of t and f can induce that other terms
must be diﬀerent, too. If an assumption that terms t and u are equal, leads
to the conclusion that f = t, then t and u must be diﬀerent. This technique
is a form of reductio ad absurdum and is the only available technique in the
data part of μCRL to prove that terms must be diﬀerent.
Constructor functions for each sort can be declared as follows:
func t, f :→ Bool
0 :→ N
succ : N→ N
We let t denote true, f denote false. The constructor 0 represents zero, and
succ stands for the successor function on the natural numbers. If a sort D
has constructor functions with D as its target sort, then all elements of that
sort can be denoted using the constructor functions. Given the declaration
above, t and f denote all booleans and each element of N can be written as
succ(. . . (succ(0) . . .)), i.e. the application of zero or more times the application
of succ to 0.
Auxiliary functions can be deﬁned using the keyword map. For instance
the standard functions on the sort Bool can be declared as follows:
map ∧,∨ : Bool×Bool → Bool
¬ : Bool → Bool
In a textual exposition we use symbols such as ∧ and ∨ and use these in the
normal mathematical way. The language μCRL which the tools can handle
assumes that all these functions are written in standard ASCII symbols and
are all preﬁx. Thus a term t∧ u is written as ‘and(t, u)’ to be consumable by
the tool set.
Auxiliary functions do not characterise the structure of sorts. A domain D
that has no constructor functions with D as target sort can in principle have
any number (> 0) of elements, even uncountably many. This means that it is
not possible to denote all elements of such a sort with a term.
Properties of functions can be determined by simple unconditional equa-
tions. A well-known characterisation of the functions for booleans is written
as follows:
var b : Bool
rew t ∧ b = b
f ∧ b = f
t ∨ b = t
f ∨ b = b
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¬t = f
¬f = t
With the keyword var variables are declared to be used in the equations. The
keyword rew comes from the verb rewrite and was chosen because rewriting
technology was considered the way to prove data terms in μCRL equal. This
term is somewhat misleading. Despite the abundant use of rewriting technol-
ogy in the tools, the equations following the keyword rew must be considered
as a set of plain unordered equations. Its meaning does not change if left and
right hand side of an equation is exchanged or if the relative position of each
equation in the rew section is altered.
This is basically all to know about the data part of μCRL. Despite its
simplicity, the language has proven itself totally apt for the speciﬁcation of
all conceivable data types. Its conciseness has a few advantages, namely that
the data speciﬁcation language can be quickly and easily understood and
that building tools for it is a relatively easy aﬀair, allowing to concentrate on
making the tools very eﬃcient.
There are also disadvantages, namely that basic data types must be deﬁned
for each speciﬁcation. The extra work that it induces is not the real problem.
The real problem is the lack of standardisation that it stimulates, i.e. before
understanding the intricacies of a process, ﬁrst the particular way the data
types have been deﬁned for this speciﬁcation must be studied. This also
hampers the development of meta knowledge on the data types and the use
of dedicated tools.
2.2 The process language
The process language of μCRL is based on the language ACP, Algebra of Com-
municating Processes [1], which is very similar to other process speciﬁcation
languages, such as for instance CCS, Calculus of Communication Processes
[24]. One of the most important concepts of these languages is an action. An
action is an atomic event of a process that indicates a communication with
the outside world or with another process. In the last case this communica-
tion takes place synchronously and is also called an interaction. Actions are
typically written as a, b, c but can also have more comprehensive names such
as timeout , send and receive.
Using the two main operators, namely a dot for sequential composition and
a plus for alternative composition, behaviour of systems can be denoted. The
process term a·b·c indicates the process that can consecutively perform actions
a, b and c. The process a·b+ c·d indicates the process that can perform either
an action a followed by an action b, or an action c followed by an action d.
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The choice between the two is made by the environment when the ﬁrst action
takes place. The sequential composition operator binds the strongest and is
often omitted if the meaning becomes clear from the context.
Using the alternative composition operator nondeterministic processes can
be described. For instance the process a·b + a·c can initially do an a action.
But it is undetermined whether it would be able to do a b or a c action after-
wards. Expressing nondeterminism is of great value. It allows to abstractly
describe processes of which the actual behaviour depends on factors that can-
not suﬃciently, concisely or conveniently be described.
A special action, denoted by τ . is called the internal action. It is an action
that cannot directly be observed, for instance because it takes place inside
a computer or because it represents a communication between two processes
that has been shielded from observers. In order to indicate that actions are
shielded the hiding operator τI where I is a set of actions can be used. The
process τ{a,c}(a·b·c) equals the process τ ·b·τ . The actions a and c are hidden.
There is a special process called inaction or deadlock, which is denoted as
δ. This is the process that cannot perform any activity. It is used for several
purposes. For instance, if it is shown that a process behaves as deadlock,
this is often an indication that there is something terribly wrong with the
interaction between processes. In order to declare that actions cannot take
place, the encapsulation operator ∂H with H a set of actions is used. The
process ∂{a,c}(a·b·c) equals δ·b·δ. And because δ satisﬁes the process equation
δ·x = δ, this process equals δ.
The parallel operator is another feature of the language. The process a·b ‖
c·d says that the actions a·b and c·d can be executed in any order (as long as
a is before b and c before d). This is called interleaving. In general, if p and
q are processes, p ‖ q denotes the process where the actions of p can happen
concurrent to the actions of q in an interleaved fashion.
Using a communication declaration it can be indicated how actions can
communicate. So, if a, b and c are actions
comm a | b = c
indicates that the actions a and b in two parallel processes can happen syn-
chronously, and the result is called c. So, to be explicit, the process a ‖ b
behaves as a·b + b·a + c. In general, synchronisation must be enforced, i.e.
it is not desirable that in a ‖ b, the actions a and b can still happen in iso-
lation. The encapsulation operator ∂H explained above can be used to block
the actions a and b. More concretely, ∂{a,b}(a ‖ b) behaves as c.
Although we have not yet explained the combination of processes with
data, it is useful to know that actions can carry data arguments. A communi-
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cation between actions can only take place if the data arguments are exactly
the same. Furthermore, for multi-party communication, the communication
declaration must be commutative and associative. Consult [15] for precise
details.
In order to specify iterative behaviour, process equations are used. A
process equation of the form
X = a·X
indicates that a process X can perform action a and then behave as X again.
In other words, the process X can perform an inﬁnite sequence of a actions.
More complex equations can be written down. The process equation Y =
a·Y ·b + c characterises a process that can do an arbitrary number of a’s, a c
and then as many b’s as it performed a’s. The process equation Z = a·(b ‖ Z)
characterises a process that can continually execute a’s and b’s where the
number of executed b’s never exceeds the number of a’s that took place.
2.3 Processes combined with data
The essence of μCRL is that data and processes have been combined. This
boils down to four extensions of the process language.
The ﬁrst extension is that actions can have data. Actions must be declared
indicating which data they must have. Assuming the existence of the data
sorts Bool and N this can be done as follows:
act a : Bool×N
a, b : N
c
Here, three actions are declared. The action a must carry either two param-
eters of sorts Bool and N, or one of sort N. The action b has a parameter of
sort N and the action c has no parameters.
The second extension is that data can be used in process equations. For-
mally spoken, the process variables now become higher order variables, which
induces a whole world of mathematical complexity to the language. However,
from a practical perspective, these equations resemble procedure declarations
in a standard programming language, and their use does not impose any prob-
lem.
The data is simply added to the process variable. So, a simple counter can
be described as follows:
proc Count(n:N) = up·Count(succ(n))
The third extension is needed to let the data inﬂuence the ﬂow of events.
Therefore the conditional operator then-if-else, denoted by   is added to
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the language. To show its use, we can extend the counter above to also count
down. The function pred subtracts one.
proc Count(n:N) = up·Count(succ(n))+
down·Count(pred(n))  n>0  δ
This process has two summands, separated by a +. Both summands indicate
actions that can occur independently. The δ at the else branch of the condition
indicates that if n = 0 no action can be performed in the second summand.
The fourth extension is the sum operator, which in a particular case can
look as follows
∑
n:N a(n). This indicates a choice between actions a(n) for
all n. This is the same as writing a(0) + a(succ(0)) + a(succ(succ(0))) + · · ·.
However using the binary operator + it is not possible to indicate a choice
between an inﬁnite number of options. This is exactly what the sum operator
has been designed to do.
Just as an illustration, we can extend the counter above with a set action,
that allows to set the counter to any arbitrary value.
proc Count(n:N) = up·Count(succ(n))+
down·Count(pred(n))  n>0  δ+∑
m:N set(m)·Count(m)
Observe that the sum operator acts as binder, similarly to the λ in the lambda
calculus, or quantiﬁers ∃, ∀ in logic.
Except for a few rarely used constructs, we have seen all language elements
of the μCRL language. A useful feature that has not been indicated yet, is
the init keyword, using which the initial state is indicated. For the counter
this could work as follows:
init Count(0)
2.4 Theory and tools
The μCRL tool set consists of a number of tools. We restrict ourselves to those
tools that have been used to transform and optimize the μCRL speciﬁcation
of the BKE-protocol, and to generate the state space. Names of the tools are
given in italics.
The most important tool, called mcrl, checks whether a speciﬁcation is a
well-formed μCRL expression. In addition, it transforms the speciﬁcation to
a linear process format. In essence this format consists of a vector of data
parameters, encoding the state of the process, and a set of condition-action-
eﬀect rules. These rules say under which condition on the data vector the
action can be executed. The eﬀect part of the rules indicates how the data
must be updated when executing the action.
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The general form of a linear process with only a single data parameter d
of type D is given by:
X(d:D) =
∑
i∈I
∑
ei:Ei
ai(fi(d, ei))·X(gi(d, ei))  ci(d, ei)  δ.
Here, I is a ﬁnite index set, and the ﬁrst
∑
i∈I must be seen as a shorthand for
a ﬁnite number of summands. The processes in Section 2.3 are linear processes
with 1, 2 and 3 summands respectively. In each summand there can be a sum
operator
∑
ei:Ei
, action ai with parameter fi depending on d and ei, eﬀect gi
and condition ci. Linear processes can have more than one data parameter,
more than one sum operator in each summand, and more arguments to each
action.
The linear process format does not contain any parallelism. Parallel op-
erators can be translated away, without substantially blowing up the size of
linear processes. In [32] the translation of arbitrary μCRL processes to linear
processes have been described in full detail.
The state vector of a linear process can be substantial in size and can
contain variables ranging over inﬁnite data types. This means that processes
with very large and even inﬁnite state spaces can be transformed to linear form.
The standardized linear form makes it easy to deﬁne and implement reduction
and analysis tools to transform and analyze processes. This enhances the
capacities of process analysis enormously. For instance a linear process with a
huge or inﬁnite state space can ﬁrst be transformed to a linear process with a
small ﬁnite state space. Subsequently, a ﬁnite state space analysis is a viable
technique that otherwise would not be possible. Concrete examples are given
below.
The tool mcrl yields a ﬁle with extension .tbf which contains the linear
process in compressed format. A prettyprinter pp can be used to view the
linear process in readable format. There are many options for the tool mcrl.
We explain only those used in Table 4. Other options can easily be found using
the -help ﬂag of each tool. The ﬂag -regular indicates that in the translation
to linear form the stack data type must be avoided (see [20] for details).
The ﬂag -nocluster indicates that summands with identical actions must not
be transformed into a single summand. The ﬂag -newstate indicates that
‘modern’ state variables must be used.
The reduction tools are formulated as ﬁlters, that can read a linear process
via standard input (stdin) and deliver the result via standard output (stdout).
For an example see Table 4. This allows chaining the reduction tools without
having to save all intermediate results. Some reduction tools must be applied
more than once, in the chain of reductions, to maximize the possible eﬀect.
One of the simpler, but very useful tools is called constelm. It eliminates
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parameters that are constant through any run of the process. E.g. applying
constelm to
proc X(n:N) = a(n)·X(n)
init X(0)
will identify that n is a constant parameter that always has value 0. So, it
reduces the linear process above to the following linear process that is strongly
bisimilar:
proc X = a(0)·X
init X
A similar tool, parelm, removes parameters that do not inﬂuence the be-
haviour of the system. For instance, in the following deﬁnition
proc X(n:N) = a·X(succ(n))
the parameter n has no eﬀect on the behaviour and can be removed. The
result is the bisimilar process:
proc X = a·X
This is one of the simplest examples where a process with an inﬁnite state
space is reduced to a process with a ﬁnite state space. The tool parelm is
especially useful when investigating properties of processes that do not depend
on certain data types.
The tool rewr simpliﬁes data terms in the linear process by rewriting them
using the equations of the data types. The tool rewr has many options that can
be switched on by using the appropriate ﬂags. The option -case for instance
adds rewrite rules to move case functions C(s, t1, . . . , tn) to the outside of
a term. A case function is a selector, i.e. C(s, t1, . . . , tn) equals ti if s = i.
Other ﬂags, which we do not use for the BKE security protocol, but that
are extremely useful elsewhere are the following. The ﬂag -prover invokes a
prover that translates terms to a BDD structure with equalities [15]. Rewrite
rules are subsequently applied to this structure. The advantage of the use of
BDDs with equalities for terms of type boolean is that these are more often
rewritten to true and false. Other options consist of -hash and -no-hash to
select whether hash tables are used during rewriting and -jitty to use the just
in time interpreting rewriter [33] instead of the standard compiling rewriter.
The tool, sumelm replaces a variable that is bound by a summation by
a data term if the variable is invariantly equal to this data term. Consider,
for example, the following expression:
∑
f :F read(f) · X(f)  f = e  δ. It
means that if f = e then read(f) ·X(f) is performed; otherwise, no action is
taken. However, since f = e the expression can be simpliﬁed to read(e) ·X(e).
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Moreover, since no action is taken if f = e, the conditional can be dropped,
and since f does not appear any longer, summation on f can be omitted
as well. Therefore, the expression is transformed to read(e) · X(e); the sum
operator is eliminated.
The tool tbfupdate replaces action labels in a linear process by others ac-
cording to a translation ﬁle. In Appendix B such a ﬁle can be found, prescrib-
ing for instance that an action c1(t) for any term t is replaced by an action
ctau without parameters. It is possible to make the renaming conditional on
the values of the actions.
The tool stategraph computes the control ﬂow from a linear process based
on a number of variables that is assumes to be the state variables. It sub-
sequently applies control ﬂow analysis to remove unreachable summands and
it correlates data parameters to control ﬂow graphs. The tool stategraph also
tries to change the value of dummy parameters and tries to guess better ini-
tial values. Especially this last step often allows constelm to remove more
parameters because these now have become constant.
The tool structelm replaces a variables of constructor sorts, i.e. sorts with
constructor functions deﬁned with func, by a variable indicating the construc-
tor that is used and variables that indicate the arguments of this constructor
function. The advantage is that tools such as constelm and parelm, which
operate on variables and not on subterms, can also eliminate parts of subex-
pressions. A typical example is the following. Consider the data type Tuple
that consists of the product of two natural numbers, and a fabricated process
that can show either the left element of this pair:
sort Frame
func frame : N× N→ Frame
map left , right : Frame → N
var l, r : Frame
rew left(frame(l, r)) = l
right(frame(l, r)) = r
proc X(f :Frame) = a(left(f))·X(f)
Applying structelm -expand Frame to this process yields the process (where
the names of the variables have been simpliﬁed for readability):
proc X(l:N, r:N) = a(l)·X(l, r)
The application of parelm allows to remove the parameter r, which was not
possible before applying structelm.
The tool confcheck and confelm are intended to check τ -conﬂuence of linear
processes and to reduce the state space of these using τ -priorisation [14]. A
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Fig. 1. The typical diagram for τ -conﬂuence
simple explanation of τ -conﬂuence can be given in terms of labelled transition
systems. The transition system is τ -conﬂuent if for each state s and outgoing
transitions s
a
−→ s′ and s
τ
−→ s′′, where a is an arbitrary label that can be τ ,
it is the case that there is a state s′′′ and transitions s′
τ
−→ s′′′ and s′′
a
−→ s′′′.
In ﬁgure 1 the typical diagram for τ -conﬂuence is drawn.
If a transition system is τ -conﬂuent, and there are no inﬁnite sequences
of τ -steps (τ -convergent), then τ -prioritization can be applied. This means
that in any state with an outgoing τ -step, all other outgoing transitions can
be removed. In a sense priority is given to the τ . Because many parts of the
transition system can become unreachable in this way, the size of the state
space can be reduced considerably. More importantly, this operation preserves
branching bisimulation [35], which means that the reduced transition system
is behaviourally equivalent to the original transition system.
Checking conﬂuence on a transition system is relatively useless, because
the transition system must ﬁrst be generated, which is diﬃcult due to the state
space explosion. In linear processes conﬂuence can be checked symbolically,
and employed when generating the state space (see instantiator -conﬂuent be-
low). The exact formulas that must be veriﬁed can be found in [13,14]. The
tool confcheck veriﬁes which τ ’s satisfy the conﬂuence property and with the
ﬂag -mark, it renames those τ ’s to ctau. In the BKE protocol we use a meta ar-
gument to understand which communications are conﬂuent and rename those
internal actions to ctau using tbfupdate.
The tool confelm uses the fact that the ctau actions satisfy conﬂuence by
applying τ -priorisation symbolically on the linear process.
There are a number of tools that we did not use in the analysis of the
BKE protocol, but which may come in very handy for other purposes. The
tools invcheck and invelm are used to check the validity of invariants on linear
processes and to simplify linear processes. The tool binary is used to translate
parameters ranging over ﬁnite data types in a linear process to a sequence of
parameters of type Bool. This is very useful when invoking the equality BDD
S. Blom et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 139 (2005) 49–90 61
prover, which is much more eﬀective on booleans than on other data types.
The tools absint and absLoader are used for abstract interpretation. It is
possible to pinpoint parameters of the linear process and abstract from these.
For instance a natural number n can be abstracted to a boolean b where b
has the meaning b := n > 0. The advantage is that this reduces the state
space, but the reduction does not preserve bisimulation. In [34] it is shown
that the reduction preserves many modal properties by introducing must- and
may-transitions.
The tool decluster replaces sum operators by explicit sums. E.g. the
summand ∑
b:Bool
a(b)·X(b)
will be replaced by
a(t)·X(t) + a(f)·X(f).
This tool generally works also on sums ranging over inﬁnite data types, pro-
vided the condition restricts the valid values to a ﬁnite number. For instance∑
n:N
a(n)·X(n)  n < 3  δ
will be replaced by
a(0)·X(0) + a(1)·X(1) + a(2)·X(2).
Furthermore, there are tools to visualize transition systems of millions of
states [36] and tools to symbolically verify modal formulas [16].
The main purpose of the simpliﬁcations above is improving the speed of
the instantiator, a tool generating the transition system from a linear process.
Reducing the execution time of the instantiator is essential, since it takes the
lion’s share of the total execution time. In our tests the instantiator has been
invoked with the following ﬂags: -monitor, allowing us to keep track of the
instantiator progress, and -trace NOT SECRET, reporting whether the action
NOT SECRET that corresponds to a security violation has been performed.
Each test has been performed twice: with -conﬂuent ctau ﬂag and without
it. This ﬂag expresses that the transition system is ctau-conﬂuent. So, it
allows the instantiator to prioritize ctau, removing other transitions in each
state with an outgoing ctau. In Table 3 this is called dynamic conﬂuence
elimination.
On a single machine with 2GB of memory, the instantiotor can gener-
ate transition systems with a size of appr. 3 107 states. For larger transi-
tion systems a distributed version of the instantiator is necessary where state
spaces of more than 1 109 states have been generated. For reduction of these
state spaces, distributed and stand alone (ltsmin, bsim) bisimulation reduc-
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tion tools are available [2], but these have not been used for the veriﬁcation
of the BKE-protocol here. Generated state spaces can also be handled by the
Caesar/Aldebaran toolset [11] which provides a large number of reduction and
veriﬁcation tools for state spaces.
3 Bilateral Key Exchange protocol with public keys
As explained in the introduction, the goal of the Bilateral Key Exchange pro-
tocol is that two parties agree upon a freshly generated secret key. In this
section we will explain this protocol in detail and discuss the μCRL speciﬁca-
tion of the protocol.
Figure 2 shows this protocol in a Message Sequence Chart. The two vertical
axes represent the two roles of the protocol, which are the initiator role I and
the responder role R. We list the initial knowledge of each of the roles above
the headers of the roles. Thus, the initiator has an asymmetric key pair
(SKi, PKi) and knows the public key of the responder PKr. Likewise, the
responder has asymmetric key pair (SKr, PKr) and knows the public key of
some initiator PKi. The way in which this initial knowledge was established
is not made explicit.
The initiator starts by creating a fresh nonce ni. This is a random, un-
predictable value which is used to make the exchanged messages unique and
thus helps to counter replay attacks. The ﬁrst message sent by the initia-
tor consists of the pair ni, I which is encrypted with the public key of the
intended responder, denoted by {ni, I}PKr. Encryption is used to guarantee
that only the intended recipient can unpack the message. The only messages
that the responder accepts have a form {ni, I}PKr, i.e., they are encrypted
by his public key, and they contain a nonce and the identity of the initiator.
Upon receipt of the message, the responder creates his own fresh nonce nr
and a fresh symmetric key kir that he wants to share with the initiator. The
goal of the protocol is to transfer this key to the initiator in a secret way.
Therefore, the responder replies with the message {h(ni), nr, kir}PKi. With
this message he proves that he was able to unpack the previous message (by
showing that he knows nonce ni, witnessed by sending a hash h(ni) of this
nonce). Furthermore, this message contains the key kir and a challenge nr.
The complete message is encrypted with the public key of the initiator to
ensure that only I can unpack the message. As above, this is the only type
of messages accepted by the initiator. Finally, the initiator responds to R’s
message by sending a hash of nonce nr encrypted with key kir. Herewith he
acknowledges receipt of the previous message. At the end of the two roles we
have listed the security claims as a special kind of event. Both participants
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claim that whenever they reach the end of their protocol the value of kir
cannot be known to an intruder.
Please notice that this protocol only guarantees secrecy of the freshly gen-
erated key. As stated before, we will not be concerned with authentication
in this paper. In fact, the above sketched version of the BKE protocol does
not guarantee authentication of the communicating parties. It suﬀers from a
man-in-the-middle attack similar to the well-known attack on the Needham-
Schroeder Public Key protocol. However, this attack does not jeopardize
secrecy of the key. The ﬁx proposed by Lowe to the Needham-Schroeder Pub-
lic Key protocol also works to repair this variant of the BKE protocol with
respect to authentication.
It should be noted that one of the supposedly honest agents might run with
the intruder. In such a case, obviously, we are not interested in his secrecy
claims. However, it would be highly undesirable if a compromised run with an
agent A would allow the intruder to impersonate A and to obtain the secret
key of the communication between A and some other honest agent B.
SKi, PKi, PKr
I
SKr, PKr, PKi
R
nonce ni
{ni, I}PKr
nonce nr
key kir
{h(ni), nr, kir}PKi
{h(nr)}kir
secret kir secret kir
msc BKE
Fig. 2. The Bilateral Key Exchange protocol with public keys
A system executing this protocol consists of a number of agents, each of
which may execute one or more instances of both roles (in parallel). When an
agent executes a role from a protocol, we call this a run. Therefore, a system
consists of a collection of runs exchanging messages to each other.
The speciﬁcation of the protocol in μCRL is given in Table 1. We require
data sorts Agent, natural numbers (N), Nonce and Key. Agents can play
S. Blom et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 139 (2005) 49–9064
proc I(self :Agent , n:N, a:Agent) =
sI({nonce(n), addr(self )}PK (a))·
∑
nr:Nonce ,key:Key rI({h(nonce(n)), nr , key}PK (self ))·
sI({h(nr)}key)·
secret(key)
proc R(self :Agent , n:N, a:Agent) =
∑
ni :Nonce,a:Agent rR({ni , addr(a)}PK (self ))·
sR({h(ni), nonce(n), K(n)}PK (a))·
rR({h(nonce(n))}K(n))·
secret(K(n))
Table 1
Speciﬁcation of the Initiator and Responder role
diﬀerent roles simultaneously. To distinguish these roles, each role gets a
unique natural number n. Moreover, both roles get an initial agent a with
whom the role wants to establish a symmetric key. We use sI (sR) and rI
(rR) to denote sending and receiving messages by the initiator (responder),
respectively. The speciﬁcation is quite straightforward and directly follows
the message sequence chart.
4 The intruder
In order to verify correctness of the protocol we need to extend the μCRL
speciﬁcation above by adding an intruder. As explained before, we assume
the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder model (see [10]), which is considered the
most general model of an adversary. This model implies that the intruder has
complete control over the network and that he can derive new messages from
his initial knowledge and messages received from honest agents. Hereby we
assume that the intruder can only decrypt messages if he is in possession of
the appropriate cryptographic key. Furthermore, we assume that a number of
agents may conspire with the intruder and try to mislead the honest agents
as to learn their secrets. Due to the capabilities of the intruder to intercept
any sent message and to insert any message which can be constructed from
his knowledge, we can model the existence of conspiring agents by assuming
that their secret keys are in the initial knowledge of the intruder.
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Now we come back to the Bilateral Key Exchange protocol. The speci-
ﬁcation from Figure 2 is correct if for any number of agents, executing any
number of runs, in the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder, whenever an honest
run enters a secrecy claim while communicating with an honest agent, the
corresponding key kir is never exposed to the intruder.
To verify the protocol, the system executes in parallel a number of runs
of the initiator, a number of runs of the responder and exactly one run of
the intruder. Every run is identiﬁed by an agent performing it and a num-
ber. Communication between the parties proceeds along four communication
channels: from the initiator to the intruder (1), from the intruder to the ini-
tiator (2), from the responder to the intruder (3) and from the intruder to the
responder (4). In other words, the initiator (the responder) sends messages
by performing action sI (sR) and reads them by performing action rI (rR)
(cf. Table 1). Unlike them, the intruder broadcasts messages to all agents
(action sE) and reads any messages present (action rE). Communication is
possible only between sE and rI , sE and rR, sI and rE, and sR and rE. In
particular, this means that the intruder gets access to all messages circulating
in the network.
We also assume that the intruder can always compute the hash function h
but given the value h(x) he cannot ﬁnd x.
In order to start the Bilateral Key Exchange protocol every participating
run should know the name of the intended partner with whom it intends to
share the secret. To implement this we require the following preparatory step
to be performed: the intruder chooses the identity of the partner for each run
and sends it to the corresponding agent. Agents use this information to choose
public keys for encryption. It should be noted that, generally speaking, this
decision could have been made by the agents themselves. However, delegating
this to the intruder makes the process τ -conﬂuent [14] and signiﬁcantly reduces
the number of states. Hence, speciﬁcations presented in Table 1 are extended
by a preliminary step of reading a name of the intended partner.
Finally, we review diﬀerent actions that can be performed by the intruder.
First of all, he listens on the incoming channels and every time a message ar-
rives, the intruder’s knowledge is updated. The intruder maintains two lists: a
list of unencrypted information obtained, and a list of pending messages wait-
ing for decryption. Initially, the ﬁrst list contains addresses of all agents, their
public keys, the secret key of the intruder himself, one nonce and one sym-
metric key. One can show that one nonce is suﬃcient to simulate an intruder
having inﬁnitely many nonces. The second list is initially empty. Every time
a new message is read, the intruder checks whether it has the corresponding
key for decryption. If this is the case the message is decrypted, its contents is
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added to the list of unencrypted information and the intruder tries to use the
contents to decrypt additional messages pending. If the message cannot be
decrypted it is simply added to the list of pending messages. To simplify the
retrieval of messages given a decryption key we organise the pending messages
list as a list of (key, lom)-pairs, where lom is a list of messages that require
key for decryption.
Next, the intruder can claim that the secrecy has been violated, if he
possesses some information that has been claimed to be secret by one of the
other parties. To do so he listens to secrecy claims of the other agents, i.e.,
performs an action secret that communicates with secrecy claims secret of the
initiator and the responder. When a key is claimed to be secret, the intruder
veriﬁes whether the key is in his possession, and in the case of a positive
answer he reports a secrecy violation.
Finally, he can send a number of diﬀerent messages:
(i) Identity of an agent and a natural number p. This message is used to
establish the partner for the run identiﬁed by p.
(ii) An unchanged message received at one of the previous steps.
(iii) A message imitating the ﬁrst message of the initiator. It encrypts a nonce
and an address.
(iv) A message imitating the message of the responder. It encrypts a hash of
a nonce, a nonce and a symmetric key.
(v) A message imitating the second message of the initiator. It contains a
hash of a nonce encrypted by a symmetric key.
5 Optimisation and state space generation
Recall that in order to verify the protocol we need to generate the state space.
To reduce the size of the state space a number of optimisations have been
performed. The ﬁrst optimisation consists of the use of types, i.e., we assume
that a nonce can always be distinguished from an address, etc. Formally, we
introduce four types of entities (data sorts): nonces, addresses, symmetric
keys, and functional keys. The latter group includes asymmetric keys and
hashes. This means that instead of two lists (unencrypted information and
pending messages) at each moment of time the intruder has to remember
six diﬀerent lists: four corresponding to four diﬀerent types of (unencrypted)
entities and two lists of pending messages: those encrypted by symmetric keys
and those encrypted by functional keys.
Second, scrutinising the protocol we observe that the hash function is
applied exclusively to nonces, and that security claims are performed only on
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symmetric keys.
Third, if the responder communicates with a compromised agent, the last
communication step can be omitted. Indeed, it neither changes the knowl-
edge of the adversary, nor can it lead to an additional security claim of the
responder.
Fourth, we keep track of a number of steps the intruder can perform. Each
initiator or responder run can perform at most three read and send actions in
the original Bilateral Key Exchange protocol and one more read action during
the preliminary step. In other words, given a number of processes n there is
no need for the intruder to send more than 4n messages.
The ﬁnal group of optimisations considers the preliminary step. First of
all, a number of messages during this step is limited by the number of partic-
ipating processes. Hence, we add a new parameter p to our implementation
of the intruder. We initialise p by the number of participating processes and
decrement it at each iteration.
Next, recall that in order for a secrecy claim to be made the correspondent
of a run should be diﬀerent from the intruder. Since we are interested in
ﬁnding secrecy violations, we require that the correspondent of at least one
run is not the intruder. We enforce this by requiring that the last considered
run (p = 1) communicates with a trusted party.
The last optimisation makes use of the particular form of the veriﬁcation
tests. Our ﬁrst assumption is that there are three diﬀerent agents: the one
that performs the role of the intruder (E), the one that performs the role of
the initiator (A) and the one that performs the role of the responder (B).
Observe that the protocol is essentially symmetric, i.e., it is of no importance
whether the initiator run performed by A with the identiﬁer 1 communicates
with B and the initiator run performed by A with the identiﬁer 3 communi-
cates with E or vice versa. Hence, we can order the agents (E < A < B) and
impose the requirement that communication partners of the initiator runs of
the same agent increase with respect to this ordering. The same can be said
for the respondent runs of the same agent. To implement this observation we
added two more parameters to our implementation of the intruder, namely aI
and aR, such that the communication partner intended for an initiator (a re-
sponder) run should be greater or equal to aI (aR). In our tests, processes with
odd numbers were performed by agent A and played the initiator role, while
processes with even numbers were performed by B and played the responder
role. Hence, even(p) allows the intruder to distinguish between initiator and
responder runs. Clearly, by allowing A to act solely as an initiator and B
solely as responder we restrict our model. However, this restriction was done
on purpose in order to imitate the assumptions of Cremers and Mauw [8] and
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proc E(K :Knowledge, p:N, aI :Agent , aR:Agent) =
. . .
∑
a:Agent(
(sE(a, p) ·E(K , P (p), aI , if (p = 2 ,E , a))  0 < p ∧ a ≥ aR  δ)
even(p)
(sE(a, p).E(K , P (p), if (p = 1 ,E , a), aR)
0 < p ∧ a ≥ aI ∧ ((p = 1 ∧ aI = E) → a = E)  δ)
)+
. . .
Table 2
Speciﬁcation of the Intruder role (fragment)
its generalization is straightforward.
The following fragment of the intruder implementation summarises the
discussion above:
6 Experimental evaluation
In this section we evaluate our approach experimentally. To do so, we have
performed a series of tests. In these tests two questions have been studied.
First, we were interested in the feasibility of our approach in terms of the state
space size. Second, the impact of conﬂuence on the state space size has been
considered. To do so, we have performed four groups of tests: without conﬂu-
ence elimination, with static conﬂuence elimination, with dynamic conﬂuence
elimination, with both static and dynamic conﬂuence elimination.
Tests of the following form have been performed for a number of processes
ranging from one to nine:
∂{rE ,sI ,rI ,sE ,sR,rR,secret ,secret } (I(A, 1) ‖ R(B, 2) ‖ I(A, 3) ‖ R(B, 4) ‖ . . .
‖ E(initialKnowledge, n, E, E)),
where secret and secret are used to express the secrecy claims. Results are
summarised in Table 3.
The way μCRL tools have been applied to produce the state space and
to verify correctness of the protocol is represented in Table 4. The μCRL
implementation of the BKE protocol and the updateﬁle can be found in Ap-
pendices A and A.1. The following should be observed. The tool structelm
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Conﬂuence Max. number of processes Number of states
no elimination 6 5936486
dynamic 7 7946676
static 8 34038583
static and dynamic 8 22520168
Table 3
Summary of results
mcrl -regular -nocluster -newstate security
tbfupdate -edit updateﬁle security | rewr | stategraph | constelm
| parelm > temp0.tbf
# static conﬂuence elimination (otherwise omit the following line):
confelm temp0.tbf | stategraph | constelm | confelm | stategraph | constelm
> temp1.tbf
structelm -expand Message temp1.tbf | rewr -case | sumelm
| parelm | stategraph | constelm | parelm > temp2.tbf
# dynamic conﬂuence elimination (otherwise omit -conﬂuent ctau):
time instantiator -conﬂuent ctau -monitor -trace NOT SECRET temp2.tbf
Table 4
Tools applied (adapt names of ﬁles tempi.tbf if lines are removed)
is called to expand the sort Message. This is the sort implementing a number
of diﬀerent kinds of messages circulating in the network. In combination with
rewr -case structelm allows the system to distinguish between them and to
generate simpliﬁed expressions for each one of the cases.
Conﬂuent sets of transitions can be used to trim the state space [13,14]. We
aimed to understand the signiﬁcance of the space reduction introduced by con-
ﬂuence exploration. Experimental results are summarised in Figure 3. Pluses
mark reference points obtained when no conﬂuence has been explored, trian-
gles correspond to dynamic conﬂuence elimination, circles to static conﬂuence
elimination, and asterisks to combination of static and dynamic conﬂuence
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elimination. Note that a logarithmic scale on the y-axis is used.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
Fig. 3. State spaces as function of the number of runs
We observe that in all cases the state space turns out to be exponential
in the number of runs. Approximation functions found by Matlab exponen-
tial ﬁtting are 102.8122x−1.6129, 102.4425x−1.833, 102.3245x−1.4612 and 102.2573x−1.4426
for no conﬂuence elimination, dynamic conﬂuence elimination, static conﬂu-
ence elimination and static and dynamic conﬂuence elimination, respectively.
These results also show that the state size reduction introduced by using con-
ﬂuence elimination techniques is exponential.
Next we turned our attention to time required to analyse the protocols. For
small number of processes (up to three) it remained independent from the state
space reduction technique applied. Hence, in the ﬁgures to come the number
of processes considered is at least four. The machine used in these experiments
is a Quad Opteron 840 with 16G RAM. We also investigated the impact of
caching for dynamic conﬂuence elimination. As above, pluses mark reference
points obtained when no conﬂuence has been explored, triangles correspond
to dynamic conﬂuence elimination, circles to static conﬂuence elimination,
and asterisks to combination of static and dynamic conﬂuence elimination.
Solid lines refer to computations with cache, dashed lines—without it. Time
is measured in seconds.
The ﬁnal group of experiments consider the impact of parallelism on the
computation. Since the parallel system contains a larger memory size. we can
expect to be able to verify the protocol for nine runs—a task for which the
same algorithm on a stand-alone machine runs out of memory. Moreover, when
the number of runs becomes suﬃciently big, time required for the analysis of
the protocol should be signiﬁcantly smaller than for sequential execution. In
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Fig. 4. Time as function of the number of runs
these experiments eight dual Athlon MP1600+ machines were used, with 2G
RAM each using the Gigabit Ethernet Protocol.
As expected parallelism indeed allowed us to obtain results for nine runs.
Since runs with no conﬂuence elimination and with dynamic conﬂuence elimi-
nation failed to verify the protocol for eight runs, only static conﬂuence elim-
ination and combination of the approaches was considered for the current
experiment. The updated version of Figure 3 taking these newly obtained
results into account can be found in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Impact of parallelism—states
We also studied impact of the parallelism on the time required by the
analysis. As before, we restricted our attention to static conﬂuence elimina-
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tion and static and dynamic conﬂuence elimination techniques. As expected,
using parallel machines results in a substantial time gain as illustrated by Fig-
ure 6. Solid lines refer to the best results obtained on the sequential machine,
dashed lines to the corresponding results for the parallel system. By carefully
observing the graph one may also notice that when the number of runs is
greater or equal to seven, time required to perform the analysis if both static
and dynamic conﬂuence elimination are performed exceeds the timing results
when solely static elimination is applied. Comparing this with Figure 5 ob-
serve that more time is spent on less states. This can be explained by the fact
that at the moment static conﬂuence elimination is the only technique that is
implemented to support parallelism. Parallel dynamic conﬂuence elimination
should be included in the coming version of the μCRL-toolset.
6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9
102
103
104
105
106
Fig. 6. Impact of parallelism—time (seconds)
7 Conclusions
In this section we summarise the main lessons learned from our experience
with implementing the BKE algorithm in μCRL and evaluating it experimen-
tally. First of all, precisely modelling protocols from an informally described
application domain remains a diﬃcult task. The μCRL implementation of
the BKE protocol has been modiﬁed a number of times to comply to its in-
tended semantics. Second, we have observed that general modeling tools are
well-suited to verify correctness of communication protocols. Finally, our ex-
periments suggest that eliminating conﬂuent transactions can be essential for
veriﬁcation, and that static conﬂuence elimination can outperform dynamic
conﬂuence elimination for large state spaces.
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A μCRL-implementation of the BKE protocol
% This mCRL model consists of two major parts: a data description
% and a processes description.
% First we introduce the Booleans including the basic operations.
sort Bool
func T,F:->Bool
map and,or:Bool#Bool->Bool
not:Bool->Bool
eq:Bool#Bool->Bool
if:Bool#Bool#Bool->Bool
imply:Bool#Bool->Bool
var x,y:Bool
rew and(T,x)=x or(T,x)=T imply(T,T)=T
and(x,T)=x or(x,T)=T imply(T,F)=F
and(x,F)=F or(x,F)=x imply(F,T)=T
and(F,x)=F or(F,x)=x imply(F,F)=T
eq(x,T)=x if(T,x,y)=x not(F)=T
eq(T,x)=x if(F,x,y)=y not(T)=F
eq(F,x)=not(x) if(x,y,y)=y
eq(x,F)=not(x)
% Secondly, we require the natural numbers with 0 and the successor
% S as constructors. This means that each natural number can be
% written as S(S(...(0)..)).
% As a shorthand we allow to write digits 1, 2, etc. eq stands for
% equality, and sm for smaller than. P is the predecessor.
sort Nat
func 0:->Nat
S:Nat->Nat
map eq:Nat#Nat->Bool
sm:Nat#Nat->Bool
plus:Nat#Nat->Nat
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9:->Nat
P:Nat->Nat
even:Nat->Bool
var n,m:Nat
rew eq(n,n)=T sm(n,n)=F eq(S(n),S(m))=eq(n,m)
eq(S(n),0)=F sm(n,0)=F sm(S(n),S(m))=sm(n,m)
eq(0,S(m))=F sm(0,S(m))=T plus(S(n),m)=S(plus(n,m))
plus(0,n)=n plus(n,0)=n plus(n,S(m))=S(plus(n,m))
even(0)=T
even(S(n))=not(even(n))
P(S(n))=n
1=S(0) 4=S(3) 7=S(6)
2=S(1) 5=S(4) 8=S(7)
3=S(2) 6=S(5) 9=S(8)
% Agents. There are exactly three agents - A, B, E.
% We use an ordering on the agents which is defined as E < A < B.
% It is used to reduce the state space which is generated.
sort Agent
func A,B,E:->Agent
map eq:Agent#Agent->Bool
sm:Agent#Agent->Bool
if:Bool#Agent#Agent->Agent
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var a,a’:Agent
rew eq(a,a)=T
eq(A,B)=F eq(B,A)=F eq(E,A)=F
eq(A,E)=F eq(B,E)=F eq(E,B)=F
if(T,a,a’)=a
if(F,a,a’)=a’
sm(A,B)=T sm(B,B)=F sm(E,B)=T
sm(A,E)=F sm(B,E)=F sm(E,E)=F
sm(A,A)=F sm(B,A)=F sm(E,A)=T
% There are two kinds of keys used in the protocol: symmetric and
% asymmetric ones (functional keys).
% Symmetric keys have form K(n) where n is a natural number.
% On symmetric keys we define equality eq and smaller than sm.
sort symKEY
map K:Nat->symKEY
eq:symKEY#symKEY->Bool
sm:symKEY#symKEY->Bool
var n,m:Nat
rew eq(K(n),K(m)) = eq(n,m)
sm(K(n),K(m)) = sm(n,m)
% A nonce is a random, unpredictable value which is used to make the
% exchanged messages unique and thus helps to counter replay attacks.
sort NONCE
map nonce:Nat->NONCE
eq:NONCE#NONCE->Bool
sm:NONCE#NONCE->Bool
var n,m:Nat
rew eq(nonce(n),nonce(m)) = eq(n,m)
sm(nonce(n),nonce(m)) = sm(n,m)
% Address is either addr(a) for some agent a or
% a special value badAddr, which is required to make address:funKEY->ADDR
% to a total function (see below). We require again the equality and
% smaller than functions.
sort ADDR
map addr:Agent->ADDR
badAddr:->ADDR
eq:ADDR#ADDR->Bool
sm:ADDR#ADDR->Bool
var a1,a2:Agent
rew eq(badAddr,badAddr) = F
eq(badAddr,addr(a2)) = F
eq(addr(a1),badAddr) = F
eq(addr(a1),addr(a2))= eq(a1,a2)
sm(badAddr,badAddr) = F
sm(badAddr,addr(a2)) = T
sm(addr(a1),addr(a2))= sm(a1,a2)
sm(addr(a1),badAddr) = F
% The sort funKEY contains the second kind of keys, functional keys.
% Functional keys are public keys (PK) and secret keys (SK). Furthermore,
% functional keys can be the result of applying a hash function (h) to
% some nonce. For a public key k, the function decode_key returns the
% corresponding secret key. For a given secret key, it returns the
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% corresponding public key. Otherwise decode_key returns a special value
% NOKEY. For a public key, the function address returns the address of the
% owner of the key. Otherwise it returns a special value badAddr.
% The constant NOKEY is needed to make decodeKEY:funKEY->funKEY to a
% total function as stated above.
sort funKEY
map PK,SK:Agent->funKEY
h:NONCE->funKEY
eq:funKEY#funKEY->Bool
sm:funKEY#funKEY->Bool
decodeKEY:funKEY->funKEY
address:funKEY->ADDR
NOKEY :->funKEY
var a1,a2:Agent
n1,n2: NONCE
rew eq(NOKEY,NOKEY) = T eq(PK(a1),NOKEY) = F
eq(NOKEY,PK(a2)) = F eq(PK(a1),PK(a2)) = eq(a1,a2)
eq(NOKEY,SK(a2)) = F eq(PK(a1),SK(a2)) = F
eq(NOKEY,h(n2)) = F eq(PK(a1),h(n2)) = F
eq(SK(a1),NOKEY) = F eq(h(n1),NOKEY) = F
eq(SK(a1),PK(a2)) = F eq(h(n1),h(n2)) = eq(n1,n2)
eq(SK(a1),SK(a2)) = eq(a1,a2) eq(h(n1),PK(a1)) = F
eq(SK(a1),h(n2)) = F eq(h(n1),SK(a1)) = F
sm(NOKEY,NOKEY) = F sm(PK(a1),NOKEY) = F
sm(NOKEY,PK(a2)) = T sm(PK(a1),PK(a2)) = sm(a1,a2)
sm(NOKEY,SK(a2)) = T sm(PK(a1),SK(a2)) = T
sm(NOKEY,h(n2)) = T sm(PK(a1),h(n2)) = T
sm(SK(a1),NOKEY) = F sm(h(n1), NOKEY) = F
sm(SK(a1),PK(a2)) = F sm(h(n1),h(n2)) = sm(n1,n2)
sm(SK(a1),SK(a2)) = sm(a1,a2) sm(h(n1),PK(a1)) = F
sm(SK(a1),h(n2)) = T sm(h(n1),SK(a1)) = F
decodeKEY(PK(a1)) = SK(a1) address(PK(a1)) = addr(a1)
decodeKEY(SK(a1)) = PK(a1) address(h(n1)) = badAddr
decodeKEY(h(n1)) = NOKEY address(SK(a1)) = badAddr
decodeKEY(NOKEY) = NOKEY address(NOKEY) = badAddr
% The eavesdropper’s knowledge (see sort Knowledge below) consists of
% six different lists of information. One of them is a sorted list of
% symmetric keys obtained by the intruder, given in the sort symKEYList.
% Initially the list contains one key. The function add adds a new element to
% the list, isIn is a membership test (required only for keys).
% The expression get(n,l) gets the nth symmetric key of the symmetric
% key list l
sort symKEYList
func emptysymKEYList:->symKEYList
insymKEY:symKEY#symKEYList->symKEYList
map add:symKEY#symKEYList->symKEYList
isIn:symKEY#symKEYList->Bool
isInAUX:Bool#symKEY#symKEYList->Bool
if:Bool#symKEYList#symKEYList->symKEYList
length:symKEYList->Nat
get:Nat#symKEYList->symKEY
initialsymKEYList:->symKEYList
var k1,k2:symKEY
l1,l2:symKEYList
n:Nat
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rew add(k1,emptysymKEYList)=insymKEY(k1,emptysymKEYList)
add(k1,insymKEY(k2,l1))=
if(sm(k1,k2),insymKEY(k1,insymKEY(k2,l1)),
if(eq(k1,k2),insymKEY(k2,l1),
insymKEY(k2,add(k1,l1))))
isIn(k1,emptysymKEYList)=F
isIn(k1,insymKEY(k2,l1))=
if(sm(k1,k2),F,isInAUX(eq(k1,k2),k1,l1))
isInAUX(T,k1,l1) = T
isInAUX(F,k1,l1) = isIn(k1,l1)
if(T,l1,l2)=l1
if(F,l1,l2)=l2
length(emptysymKEYList)=0
length(insymKEY(k1,l1))=S(length(l1))
get(0,insymKEY(k1,l1))=k1
get(S(n),insymKEY(k1,l1))=get(n,l1)
initialsymKEYList = add(K(0), emptysymKEYList)
% A sorted list of nonces is also a part of the eavesdropper’s knowledge.
% Initially the eavesdropper possesses one nonce. One can show that
% this is sufficient to simulate an eavesdropper with infinitely many
% nonces.
sort NONCEList
func emptyNONCEList:->NONCEList
inNONCE:NONCE#NONCEList->NONCEList
map add:NONCE#NONCEList->NONCEList
if:Bool#NONCEList#NONCEList->NONCEList
length:NONCEList->Nat
get:Nat#NONCEList->NONCE
initialNONCEList:->NONCEList
var k1,k2:NONCE
l1,l2:NONCEList
n:Nat
rew add(k1,emptyNONCEList)=inNONCE(k1,emptyNONCEList)
add(k1,inNONCE(k2,l1))=
if(sm(k1,k2),inNONCE(k1,inNONCE(k2,l1)),
if(eq(k1,k2),inNONCE(k2,l1),
inNONCE(k2,add(k1,l1))))
if(T,l1,l2)=l1
if(F,l1,l2)=l2
length(emptyNONCEList)=0
length(inNONCE(k1,l1))=S(length(l1))
get(0,inNONCE(k1,l1))=k1
get(S(n),inNONCE(k1,l1))=get(n,l1)
initialNONCEList = add(nonce(0), emptyNONCEList)
% A sorted list of addresses is also a part of intruder’s knowledge.
% All addresses are public. Hence, the initial knowledge of the
% intruder consists of the addresses of all the agents.
sort ADDRList
func emptyADDRList:->ADDRList
inADDR:ADDR#ADDRList->ADDRList
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map add:ADDR#ADDRList->ADDRList
if:Bool#ADDRList#ADDRList->ADDRList
length:ADDRList->Nat
get:Nat#ADDRList->ADDR
initialADDRList:->ADDRList
var k1,k2:ADDR
l1,l2:ADDRList
n:Nat
rew add(k1,emptyADDRList)=inADDR(k1,emptyADDRList)
add(k1,inADDR(k2,l1))=
if(sm(k1,k2),inADDR(k1,inADDR(k2,l1)),
if(eq(k1,k2),inADDR(k2,l1),
inADDR(k2,add(k1,l1))))
if(T,l1,l2)=l1
if(F,l1,l2)=l2
length(emptyADDRList)=0
length(inADDR(k1,l1))=S(length(l1))
get(0,inADDR(k1,l1))=k1
get(S(n),inADDR(k1,l1))=get(n,l1)
initialADDRList = add(addr(A), add(addr(B),
add(addr(E), emptyADDRList)))
% The intruder also keeps a sorted list of functional keys.
% Initially all public keys are known to the intruder. And
% naturally the eavesdropper initially knows its own
% secret key.
sort funKEYList
func emptyfunKEYList:->funKEYList
infunKEY:funKEY#funKEYList->funKEYList
map add:funKEY#funKEYList->funKEYList
isIn:funKEY#funKEYList->Bool
isInAUX:Bool#funKEY#funKEYList->Bool
if:Bool#funKEYList#funKEYList->funKEYList
length:funKEYList->Nat
get:Nat#funKEYList->funKEY
initialfunKEYList :->funKEYList
var k1,k2:funKEY
l1,l2:funKEYList
n:Nat
rew add(k1,emptyfunKEYList)=infunKEY(k1,emptyfunKEYList)
add(k1,infunKEY(k2,l1))=
if(sm(k1,k2),infunKEY(k1,infunKEY(k2,l1)),
if(eq(k1,k2),infunKEY(k2,l1),
infunKEY(k2,add(k1,l1))))
isIn(k1,emptyfunKEYList)=F
isIn(k1,infunKEY(k2,l1))=
if(sm(k1,k2),F,isInAUX(eq(k1,k2),k1,l1))
isInAUX(T,k1,l1) = T
isInAUX(F,k1,l1) = isIn(k1,l1)
if(T,l1,l2)=l1
if(F,l1,l2)=l2
length(emptyfunKEYList)=0
length(infunKEY(k1,l1))=S(length(l1))
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get(0,infunKEY(k1,l1))=k1
get(S(n),infunKEY(k1,l1))=get(n,l1)
initialfunKEYList = add(PK(A), add(PK(B),
add(PK(E), add(SK(E), emptyfunKEYList))))
% The sort Message contains all the messages that are exchanged
% in the BKE protocol. There three kinds of messages:
% two sent by the initiator and one sent by the responder.
% The second message sent by an initiator consists of a functional
% key encrypted by a symmetric key. The first message sent by an
% initiator contains a nonce and an address encrypted by a
% functional key. The message sent by the receiver contains a
% functional key, a nonce, a symmetric key and it is encrypted by
% a functional key. The functions get... are projections to extract
% information from the messages.
% The functions encryptedN (N=1,2,3) indicate whether a message
% has a particular form. The function encrypted1 is true if its
% first argument has the form of the second I-message and the key
% used during the encryption is its second argument.
% The function encrypted2 is true if its first argument has the form
% of the first I-message and the key used during the encryption
% is its second argument. The function encrypted3 is true if its
% first argument has the form of the R-message and the key used
% during the encryption is its second argument. Two messages are equal,
% expressed using the function eq iff they are of the same kind
% and all components are equal.
% The function sm defines an ordering on messages. This ordering is
% defined as follows:
% for any fk1,sk2,n1,a2,fk3,fk1’,n2,sk3 and fk4
% encrypt(fk1,sk2) < encrypt(n1,a2,fk3) < encrypt(fk1’,n2,sk3,fk4).
% Messages of the same kind are compared lexicographically.
sort Message
func encrypt:funKEY#symKEY->Message
encrypt:NONCE#ADDR#funKEY->Message
encrypt:funKEY#NONCE#symKEY#funKEY->Message
map eq:Message#Message->Bool
get1N:Message->NONCE
get1f:Message->funKEY
get2N:Message->NONCE
get2A:Message->ADDR
get3s:Message->symKEY
sm:Message#Message->Bool
encrypted1:Message#symKEY->Bool
encrypted2:Message#funKEY->Bool
encrypted3:Message#funKEY->Bool
var fk1,fk1’,fk3,fk3’,fk4,fk4’,fk5 :funKEY
sk2,sk2’,sk3,sk3’,sk4,sk5:symKEY
n1,n1’,n2,n2’:NONCE
a2,a2’:ADDR
rew eq(encrypt(fk1,sk2),encrypt(n1’,a2’,fk3’))=F
eq(encrypt(fk1,sk2),encrypt(fk1’,n2’,sk3’,fk4’))=F
eq(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),encrypt(fk1’,sk2’))=F
eq(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),encrypt(fk1’,n2’,sk3’,fk4’))=F
eq(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),encrypt(fk1’,sk2’))=F
eq(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),encrypt(n1’,a2’,fk3’))=F
eq(encrypt(fk1,sk2),encrypt(fk1’,sk2’))=
and(eq(fk1,fk1’),eq(sk2,sk2’))
eq(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),encrypt(n1’,a2’,fk3’))=
and(eq(n1,n1’),
and(eq(a2,a2’), eq(fk3, fk3’)))
eq(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),encrypt(fk1’,n2’,sk3’,fk4’))=
S. Blom et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 139 (2005) 49–90 81
and(eq(fk1,fk1’),
and(eq(n2,n2’),
and(eq(sk3,sk3’), eq(fk4, fk4’))))
get1f(encrypt(fk1,sk2))=fk1
get1f(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4))=fk1
get1N(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3))=n1
get2A(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3))=a2
get2N(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4))=n2
get3s(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4))=sk3
sm(encrypt(fk1,sk2),encrypt(fk1’,sk2’))=
or(sm(fk1,fk1’),
and(eq(fk1,fk1’),sm(sk2,sk2’)))
sm(encrypt(fk1,sk2),encrypt(n1’,a2’,fk3’))=T
sm(encrypt(fk1,sk2),encrypt(fk1’,n2’,sk3’,fk4’))=T
sm(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),encrypt(fk1’,sk2’))=F
sm(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),encrypt(n1’,a2’,fk3’))=
or(sm(n1,n1’),
and(eq(n1,n1’),
or(sm(a2,a2’),
and(eq(a2,a2’),
sm(fk3,fk3’)))))
sm(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),encrypt(fk1’,n2’,sk3’,fk4’))=T
sm(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),encrypt(fk1’,sk2’))=F
sm(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),encrypt(n1’,a2’,fk3’))=F
sm(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),encrypt(fk1’,n2’,sk3’,fk4’))=
or(sm(fk1,fk1’),
and(eq(fk1,fk1’),
or(sm(n2,n2’),
and(eq(n2,n2’),
or(sm(sk3,sk3’),
and(eq(sk3,sk3’),
sm(fk4,fk4’)))))))
encrypted1(encrypt(fk1,sk2),sk3)=eq(sk2,sk3)
encrypted1(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),sk4)=F
encrypted1(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),sk5)=F
encrypted2(encrypt(fk1,sk2),fk3)=F
encrypted2(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),fk4)=eq(fk3,fk4)
encrypted2(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),fk5)=F
encrypted3(encrypt(fk1,sk2),fk3)=F
encrypted3(encrypt(n1,a2,fk3),fk4)=F
encrypted3(encrypt(fk1,n2,sk3,fk4),fk5)=eq(fk4,fk5)
% The sort MessageList contains sorted list of messages obtained by
% the intruder. It has the same operations as the lists of nonces
% and addresses. We do not store the messages directly in the intruder’s
% knowledge but distinguish between those encoded by symmetric keys and
% and those encoded by the functional keys (see ConditionalfunKEYList and
% ConditionalsymKEYList below).
sort MessageList
func emptyMessageList:->MessageList
inMessage:Message#MessageList->MessageList
map add:Message#MessageList->MessageList
if:Bool#MessageList#MessageList->MessageList
length:MessageList->Nat
get:Nat#MessageList->Message
var m1,m2:Message
l1,l2:MessageList
n:Nat
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rew add(m1,emptyMessageList)=inMessage(m1,emptyMessageList)
add(m1,inMessage(m2,l1))=
if(sm(m1,m2),inMessage(m1,inMessage(m2,l1)),
if(eq(m1,m2),inMessage(m2,l1),
inMessage(m2,add(m1,l1))))
if(T,l1,l2)=l1
if(F,l1,l2)=l2
length(emptyMessageList)=0
length(inMessage(m1,l1))=S(length(l1))
get(0,inMessage(m1,l1))=m1
get(S(n),inMessage(m1,l1))=get(n,l1)
% The sort funEncaps is an auxiliary sort, needed in ConditionalfunKEYList.
% It represents a pair of (ConditionalfunKEYList,MessageList).
sort funEncaps
func encaps:ConditionalfunKEYList#MessageList->funEncaps
map pr1: funEncaps->ConditionalfunKEYList
pr2: funEncaps->MessageList
if:Bool#funEncaps#funEncaps->funEncaps
var fcl:ConditionalfunKEYList
ml:MessageList
fe1,fe2:funEncaps
rew pr1(encaps(fcl,ml)) = fcl
pr2(encaps(fcl,ml)) = ml
if(T,fe1,fe2)=fe1
if(F,fe1,fe2)=fe2
% The list of the messages received by the intruder that are indexed by
% functional keys is given in the sort ConditionalFunKEYList. The list has
% the form <fk1,l1,fk2,l2,...> where each li is a list of messages
% received so far that are encrypted by the preceeding
% functional key fki. The function addCond adds a pair (funKEY,Message)
% to an existing list ConditionalfunKEYList and returns an updated list.
% The function removeCond removes messages encoded by funKEY from the
% list ConditionalfunKEYList. It returns a pair encoded by the sort
% funEncaps: an updated list ConditionalfunKEYList and a list of messages
% corresponding to funKEY in the original list. If no messages encoded
% by funKEY are present, it returns an unchanged list ConditionalfunKEYList
% and an empty list of messages. The second equation for the function
% addCond is quite complex. It makes a distinction between the values of
% k1 and k2. If k1<k2 then (k1,m) should be added at the front of the
% list of messages. If k1 = k2 then the intruder has already some
% messages encrypted by k1. Therefore, m has to be added to the
% corresponding list of messages. If k1>k2 then, since the list is
% ordered, we proceed with adding (k,m) to its tail. A similar distinction
% is made for removeCond.
sort ConditionalfunKEYList
func emptyCfunKEYList:->ConditionalfunKEYList
inCfunKEY:funKEY#MessageList#ConditionalfunKEYList->
ConditionalfunKEYList
map addCond:funKEY#Message#ConditionalfunKEYList->
ConditionalfunKEYList
removeCond:funKEY#ConditionalfunKEYList->funEncaps
if:Bool#ConditionalfunKEYList#ConditionalfunKEYList->
ConditionalfunKEYList
getMessageList:Nat#ConditionalfunKEYList->MessageList
length:ConditionalfunKEYList->Nat
var k1,k2:funKEY
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m:Message
L:MessageList
CL,CL1:ConditionalfunKEYList
n:Nat
rew addCond(k1,m,emptyCfunKEYList)=
inCfunKEY(k1,inMessage(m,emptyMessageList),
emptyCfunKEYList)
addCond(k1,m,inCfunKEY(k2,L,CL))=
if(sm(k1,k2),
inCfunKEY(k1,inMessage(m,emptyMessageList),inCfunKEY(k2,L,CL)),
if(eq(k1,k2),
inCfunKEY(k2,add(m,L),CL),
inCfunKEY(k2,L,addCond(k1,m,CL))))
removeCond(k1,emptyCfunKEYList)=
encaps(emptyCfunKEYList,emptyMessageList)
removeCond(k1,inCfunKEY(k2,L,CL))=
if(sm(k1,k2),
encaps(CL,emptyMessageList),
if(eq(k1,k2),
encaps(CL,L),
encaps(inCfunKEY(k2,L,pr1(removeCond(k1,CL))),
pr2(removeCond(k1,CL)))))
if(T,CL,CL1)=CL
if(F,CL,CL1)=CL1
length(emptyCfunKEYList) = 0
length(inCfunKEY(k1,L,CL)) = S(length(CL))
getMessageList(n,emptyCfunKEYList) = emptyMessageList
getMessageList(0,inCfunKEY(k1,L,CL)) = L
getMessageList(S(n),inCfunKEY(k1,L,CL)) = getMessageList(n,CL)
% The sort symEncaps is also auxiliary, similar to funEncaps.
sort symEncaps
func encaps:ConditionalsymKEYList#MessageList->symEncaps
map pr1: symEncaps->ConditionalsymKEYList
pr2: symEncaps->MessageList
if:Bool#symEncaps#symEncaps->symEncaps
var fcl:ConditionalsymKEYList
ml:MessageList
se1,se2:symEncaps
rew pr1(encaps(fcl,ml)) = fcl
pr2(encaps(fcl,ml)) = ml
if(T,se1,se2)=se1
if(F,se1,se2)=se2
% The sort ConditionalsymKEYList contains a list of messages received
% en that have been encoded by symmetric keys. For
% explanations see ConditionalfunKEYList above, which has exactly
% the same structure.
sort ConditionalsymKEYList
func emptyCsymKEYList:->ConditionalsymKEYList
inCsymKEY:symKEY#MessageList#ConditionalsymKEYList->
ConditionalsymKEYList
map addCond:symKEY#Message#ConditionalsymKEYList->
ConditionalsymKEYList
removeCond:symKEY#ConditionalsymKEYList->symEncaps
if:Bool#ConditionalsymKEYList#ConditionalsymKEYList->
ConditionalsymKEYList
getMessageList:Nat#ConditionalsymKEYList->MessageList
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length:ConditionalsymKEYList->Nat
var k1,k2:symKEY
m: Message
L:MessageList
CL,CL1:ConditionalsymKEYList
n:Nat
rew addCond(k1,m,emptyCsymKEYList)=
inCsymKEY(k1,inMessage(m,emptyMessageList),
emptyCsymKEYList)
addCond(k1,m,inCsymKEY(k2,L,CL))=
if(sm(k1,k2),
inCsymKEY(k1,inMessage(m,emptyMessageList),
inCsymKEY(k2,L,CL)),
if(eq(k1,k2),
inCsymKEY(k2,add(m,L),CL),
inCsymKEY(k2,L,addCond(k1,m,CL))))
removeCond(k1,emptyCsymKEYList)=
encaps(emptyCsymKEYList,emptyMessageList)
removeCond(k1,inCsymKEY(k2,L,CL))=
if(sm(k1,k2),
encaps(CL,emptyMessageList),
if(eq(k1,k2),
encaps(CL,L),
encaps(inCsymKEY(k2,L,pr1(removeCond(k1,CL))),
pr2(removeCond(k1,CL)))))
if(T,CL,CL1)=CL
if(F,CL,CL1)=CL1
length(emptyCsymKEYList)=0
length(inCsymKEY(k1,L,CL))=S(length(CL))
getMessageList(n,emptyCsymKEYList)=emptyMessageList
getMessageList(0,inCsymKEY(k1,L,CL))=L
getMessageList(S(n),inCsymKEY(k1,L,CL))=getMessageList(n,CL)
% The sort Knowledge of the intruder. This sort implements the entire
% knowledge of the intruder, consisting of six different lists: two
% lists of messages (encoded by symmetric and functional keys), and
% lists of symmetric keys, functional keys, nonces and addresses. The
% most important function of this sort is updateKnowledge that given
% a (list of) message(s) and the current state of intruder’s knowledge
% updates it and returns the updated state of knowledge. Updating knowledge
% is a recursive process since decrypting a message can result in obtaining
% new symmetric or functional keys that in their turn can be used to
% decrypt further messages. This propagation step is modeled by two
% auxiliary functions propagates and propagatef.
sort Knowledge
func wrap:ConditionalsymKEYList#ConditionalfunKEYList#
symKEYList#funKEYList#NONCEList#ADDRList->Knowledge
map fEncMessages: Knowledge->ConditionalfunKEYList
sEncMessages: Knowledge->ConditionalsymKEYList
fKEYs: Knowledge->funKEYList
sKEYs: Knowledge->symKEYList
addresses: Knowledge->ADDRList
nonces: Knowledge->NONCEList
if:Bool#Knowledge#Knowledge->Knowledge
updateKnowledge:Message#Knowledge->Knowledge
updateKnowledge:MessageList#Knowledge->Knowledge
propagates:symKEY#Knowledge->Knowledge
propagatef:funKEY#Knowledge->Knowledge
S. Blom et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 139 (2005) 49–90 85
initialKnowledge:->Knowledge
var scl: ConditionalsymKEYList
fcl:ConditionalfunKEYList
sl: symKEYList
fl: funKEYList
nl:NONCEList
al:ADDRList
K1,K2:Knowledge
f,f1:funKEY
s:symKEY
n:NONCE
a:ADDR
ml:MessageList
m: Message
rew sEncMessages(wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) = scl
fEncMessages(wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) = fcl
sKEYs(wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) = sl
fKEYs(wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) = fl
addresses(wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) = al
nonces(wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) = nl
if(T,K1,K2) = K1
if(F,K1,K2) = K2
updateKnowledge(encrypt(f,s),wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) =
if(isIn(s,sl),
propagatef(f,wrap(scl,fcl,sl,add(f,fl),nl,al)),
wrap(addCond(s,encrypt(f,s),scl),fcl,sl,fl,nl,al))
updateKnowledge(encrypt(n,a,f),wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) =
if(isIn(decodeKEY(f),fl),
wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,add(n,nl),add(a,al)),
wrap(scl,addCond(f,encrypt(n,a,f),fcl),sl,fl,nl,al))
updateKnowledge(encrypt(f1,n,s,f),wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) =
if(isIn(decodeKEY(f),fl),
propagates(s,
propagatef(f1,
wrap(scl,fcl,add(s,sl),add(f1,fl),add(n,nl),al))),
wrap(scl,addCond(f,encrypt(f1,n,s,f),fcl),sl,fl,nl,al))
updateKnowledge(emptyMessageList,K1) = K1
updateKnowledge(inMessage(m,ml),K1) =
updateKnowledge(ml,updateKnowledge(m,K1))
propagates(s,wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) =
updateKnowledge(pr2(removeCond(s,scl)),
wrap(pr1(removeCond(s,scl)),fcl,sl,fl,nl,al))
propagatef(f,wrap(scl,fcl,sl,fl,nl,al)) =
updateKnowledge(pr2(removeCond(f,fcl)),
wrap(scl,pr1(removeCond(f,fcl)),sl,fl,nl,al))
initialKnowledge =
wrap(emptyCsymKEYList,emptyCfunKEYList,
initialsymKEYList, initialfunKEYList,
initialNONCEList, initialADDRList)
% Here we are finished with the required datatypes. Below we
% define the processes. We start out with declaring the actions
% that the processes use to communicate. Using the comm declaration
% section, it is defined how these action communicate. Then we
% model three processes, the initiator, the responder and the
% eavesdropper (Iproc, Rproc and Eproc). Then we define different
% constellations of initiators, responder and eavesdroppers that
% we have analysed. The concrete selection is made using the
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% keyword init at the end.
act sE :Message % send of the eavesdropper.
sE :Agent#Nat % send of the eavesdropper
% (the preliminary step).
rE :Message % receive of the eavesdropper.
sI :Message % send of the initiator.
rI :Message % receive of the initiator.
rI :Agent#Nat % receive of the initiator
% (the preliminary step).
sR :Message % send of the responder.
rR :Message % receive of the responder.
rR :Agent#Nat % receive of the responder
% (the preliminary step).
c1,c2,c3,c4:Message % communication between sends
% and receives. See "comm" below.
c2,c4 :Agent#Nat % communication between sends and
% receives. See "comm" below
% (the preliminary step).
secret :symKEY % secrecy claims of the initiator
% and the responder.
secret_ :symKEY % the receipt of a claim by the
% eavesdropper to check whether
% it knows the secret.
secret__ :symKEY % communication of secrecy claims.
NOT_SECRET % secrecy violation indicator.
% Below it is defined on which channels the different
% processes synchronize to exchange information.
comm sI|rE = c1 % from the initiator to the intruder
sE|rI = c2 % from the intruder to the initiator
sR|rE = c3 % from the responder to the intruder
sE|rR = c4 % from the intruder to the responder
secret|secret_ = secret__
% Below we model the initiator. The initiator starts by creating a
% fresh nonce. The first message sent by the initiator consists of
% the nonce and his address encrypted with the public key of the
% intended responder. Then, the initiator reads a message, verifies
% that it has the expected form (a functional key and a hash of a
% nonce encrypted by the initiator’s public key), and acknowledges
% receipt of the message by sending hash of the shared nonce
% encrypted by the shared symmetric key. Finally, the initiator
% claims security of the shared symmetric key. For further details
% see the main text.
proc Iproc(self:Agent,n:Nat)=
sum(a:Agent,rI(a,n).
sI(encrypt(nonce(n),addr(self),PK(a))).
sum(m:Message,rI(m).
(sI(encrypt(h(get2N(m)),get3s(m))).
(secret(get3s(m))<|not(eq(a,E))|>delta).delta)
<|and(encrypted3(m,PK(self)),eq(get1f(m),h(nonce(n))))|> delta
))
% The responder is similarly to the initiator. The responder starts
% by receiving a message, verifies that it is in the expected form
% (contains the address of the presumed counterpart encrypted by the
% responder’s public key), generates a new nonce and sends a message
% consisting of the hashed nonce of the counterpart, the newly
% created nonce and the symmetric key to be shared, encrypted by the
% public key of the counterpart. Next, the responder reads a new
% message, verifies that it has been encrypted by the shared symmetric
% key and contains the hash function of his nonce, and claims secrecy
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% of the shared key. Additional information can be found in the main text.
proc Rproc(self:Agent,n:Nat)=
sum(a:Agent,rR(a,n).
sum(m1:Message,rR(m1).
sR(encrypt(h(get1N(m1)),nonce(n),K(n),PK(a))).
(sum(m2:Message,rR(m2).
secret(K(n)).delta
<| and(not(eq(a,E)),and(encrypted1(m2,K(n)),
eq(get1f(m2),h(nonce(n))))) |> delta
))
<| and(eq(get2A(m1),addr(a)),
encrypted2(m1,PK(self))) |> delta
))
% The process Eproc models the eavesdropper. The first summand (action rE)
% describes the receipt of a message. This message is immediately added to
% the knowledge that the eavesdropper already has. The next summands, except
% the last, describe the sending of an arbitrary message that can be
% constructed with the knowledge of the eavesdropper. In this way all
% possible attacks on the protocol are modelled. The last summand consists
% of receiving a supposed to be secret. If the eavesdropper knows it,
% it signals a NOT_SECRET action. Please refer to Section 4 of
% the main text for further details.
proc Eproc(K:Knowledge,p:Nat,aI:Agent,aR:Agent)=
sum(m:Message,rE(m).Eproc(updateKnowledge(m,K),p,aI,aR)
<| eq(0,p) |> delta) +
sum(a:Agent,
(sE(a,p).Eproc(K,P(p),aI,if(eq(p,2),E,a))
<| and(sm(0,p),not(sm(a,aR))) |> delta)
<| even(p) |>
(sE(a,p).Eproc(K,P(p),if(eq(p,1),E,a),aR)
<| and(and(sm(0,p),not(sm(a,aI))),
imply(and(eq(p,1),eq(aI,E)),
not(eq(a,E)))) |> delta))+
sum(n1:Nat,sum(n2:Nat,
sE(encrypt(h(get(n1,nonces(K))),
get(n2,sKEYs(K)))).Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
<|and(eq(0,p),
and(sm(n1,length(nonces(K))),
sm(n2,length(sKEYs(K)))))
|>delta)) +
sum(n1:Nat,sum(n2:Nat,
sE(encrypt(get(n1,fKEYs(K)),
get(n2,sKEYs(K)))).Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
<|and(eq(0,p),
and(sm(n1,length(fKEYs(K))),
sm(n2,length(sKEYs(K)))))
|>delta)) +
sum(n1:Nat,sum(n2:Nat,sum(n3:Nat,
sE(encrypt(get(n1,nonces(K)),get(n2,addresses(K)),
get(n3,fKEYs(K)))).Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
<|and(eq(0,p),
and(sm(n1,length(nonces(K))),
and(sm(n2,length(addresses(K))),
sm(n3,length(fKEYs(K))))))
|>delta)))+
sum(n1:Nat,sum(n2:Nat,sum(n3:Nat,sum(n4:Nat,
S. Blom et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 139 (2005) 49–9088
sE(encrypt(h(get(n1,nonces(K))),get(n2,nonces(K)),
get(n3,sKEYs(K)),get(n4,fKEYs(K)))).
Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
<|and(eq(0,p),
and(sm(n1,length(nonces(K))),
and(sm(n2,length(nonces(K))),
and(sm(n3,length(sKEYs(K))),
sm(n4,length(fKEYs(K)))))))
|>delta))))+
sum(n1:Nat,sum(n2:Nat,sum(n3:Nat,sum(n4:Nat,
sE(encrypt(get(n1,fKEYs(K)),get(n2,nonces(K)),
get(n3,sKEYs(K)),get(n4,fKEYs(K)))).
Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
<|and(eq(0,p),
and(sm(n1,length(fKEYs(K))),
and(sm(n2,length(nonces(K))),
and(sm(n3,length(sKEYs(K))),
sm(n4,length(fKEYs(K)))))))
|>delta))))+
sum(n1:Nat,sum(n2:Nat,
sE(get(n2,getMessageList(n1,sEncMessages(K)))).
Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
<|and(eq(0,p),
and(sm(n1,length(sEncMessages(K))),
sm(n2,length(getMessageList(n1,sEncMessages(K))))))
|>delta))+
sum(n1:Nat,sum(n2:Nat,
sE(get(n2,getMessageList(n1,fEncMessages(K)))).
Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
<|and(eq(0,p),
and(sm(n1,length(fEncMessages(K))),
sm(n2,length(getMessageList(n1,fEncMessages(K))))))
|>delta))+
sum(k:symKEY, secret_(k).
(NOT_SECRET.Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
<| isIn(k,sKEYs(K)) |>
Eproc(K,p,aI,aR)
))
% System1..System9 are used to test the protocol for 1..9 processes.
% To generate the state space: replace ’init System5’ below by ’init
% SystemN’, where N is the desired number of processes.
proc System1=
encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,1,E,E))
proc System2=
encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||Rproc(B,2)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,2,E,E))
proc System3=
encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||Rproc(B,2)||
Iproc(A,3)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,3,E,E))
proc System4=
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encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||Rproc(B,2)||
Iproc(A,3)||Rproc(B,4)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,4,E,E))
proc System5=
encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||Rproc(B,2)||
Iproc(A,3)||Rproc(B,4)||
Iproc(A,5)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,5,E,E))
proc System6=
encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||Rproc(B,2)||
Iproc(A,3)||Rproc(B,4)||
Iproc(A,5)||Rproc(B,6)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,6,E,E))
proc System7=
encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||Rproc(B,2)||
Iproc(A,3)||Rproc(B,4)||
Iproc(A,5)||Rproc(B,6)||
Iproc(A,7)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,7,E,E))
proc System8=
encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||Rproc(B,2)||
Iproc(A,3)||Rproc(B,4)||
Iproc(A,5)||Rproc(B,6)||
Iproc(A,7)||Rproc(B,8)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,8,E,E))
proc System9=
encap({rE,sI,rI,sE,sR,rR,secret,secret_},
Iproc(A,1)||Rproc(B,2)||
Iproc(A,3)||Rproc(B,4)||
Iproc(A,5)||Rproc(B,6)||
Iproc(A,7)||Rproc(B,8)||
Iproc(A,9)||
Eproc(initialKnowledge,9,E,E))
init System5
B Updateﬁle
The ﬁle updatefile contains renamings of actions. E.g. in the description below the action c1(X)
is renamed to ctau where X is any parameter. It is possible to formulate conditions on these
parameters to perform conditional renaming. This is not used below. The tool tbfupdate is
needed to carry out the actual renaming on a linear process.
c1(X) -> ctau
c2(X) -> tau
c3(X) -> ctau
c4(X) -> tau
c2(X,Y) -> tau
c4(X,Y) -> tau
secret__(X) -> tau
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